India’s Middle East Policy Part — III : Israel - an ideological rapprochement
In the last posts we have seen how India’s geopolitics was shaped during Nehru’s regime, how slowly we moved away from a strategy of proactive involvement in regional disputes during the Nehru years (Suez, Lebanon), to aligning with specific privileged partners in the region (Egypt, Iraq), and finally to engaging in omni-balancing all actors and interests in the region (in the 1990s).
If you have missed my earlier series , please read it here -
India’s Middle East Policy Part — I : Relation with Egypt , Saudi Arabia and the 1965 War
The shifting of policies and approach to the region such as access to energy resources and especially oil, preserving open trade routes, increasing or maintaining some degree of political influence in the region notably to counterbalance Pakistan’s own diplomatic influence in the Middle East, attracting foreign direct investments, and finally ensuring the welfare of India’s growing diaspora in the region since the 1970s.
We will now focus on the change that happened during Modi’s regime post 2014.
Israel: an ideological rapprochement
The BJP (and its predecessor, the Jana Sangh) had long highlighted that India’s long-standing and unconditional backing of the Arab states had never been reciprocated in international institutions when India needed support in its disputes with Pakistan.
In the past BJP government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2004) had welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in New Delhi in September 2003.
Modi himself being the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Gujarat had directly discussed agricultural cooperation with Israel when he visited Israel in 2006 and promised that he would come back to Tel Aviv when he became prime minister.
What one has to also remember is the previous NDA government was a coalition and had to balance the large coalition while the BJP in 2014 had more political and institutional leverage to implement Modi’s own policy preferences and to push for a long BJP policy proposal to tilt towards Israel.
Modi became the first sitting Indian Prime Minister to visit Tel Aviv in July 2017
Modi publicly met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2014 and again during the Paris Climate Change Conference in November 2015. More importantly, Modi became the first sitting Indian Prime Minister to visit Tel Aviv in July 2017.
Breaking with another informal pattern established through previous ministerial visits, Modi also deliberately decided not to make a stop by Ramallah when visiting Israel in 2017
Netanyahu then lated paid a visit to New Delhi in January 2018 . India now were not shy and moved away from the more discreet approach towards Israel adopted by INC-led governments or the previous BJP-led government had done during 1998 to 2003.
Remember the previous Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had for instance never met with any Israeli ministers during his ten years in office (2004–2014).
India abstained in July 2015 and in March 2016 from supporting a Palestine-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to launch a probe by the International Criminal Court against Israel for war crimes during the 2014 Gaza crisis. We moved away from a traditional posture of supporting Pro-Palestine resolutions in UN bodies,
Defence Purchases
India and Israel defence ties also expanded under Modi’s tenure, as India bought 250 SPICE 2000 bombs from Israel’s Rafael systems in 2016, which were then used to strike a supposed terrorist camp in Balakot inside of Pakistan in March 2019 , as well as surveillance drones and Spike anti-tank guided missiles in June 2020 in the midst of the boundary dispute with China in Eastern Ladakh
Another hallmark of a shift under Modi has been that, in parallel to the overtures made to Israel, the Indian government also pushed for a reengagement of Iran. The 2015 nuclear deal — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — signed by Iran and the P5 + 1 was perceived by the Modi government as a window of opportunity to further economic engagement with Iran after years of international embargo
Iran — Chabahar deal which had been 13 years in the making.
During his May 2016 visit to Tehran, Modi concluded a tripartite contract (along with Afghanistan) for the expansion of the strategically located Chabahar Port
For an energy-starved and rapidly growing India, the Chabahar Port was perceived as a vital link to the resource- and mineral-rich Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Yet, here again, Modi’s foreign policy towards Iran can be viewed as an example of successful political entrepreneurship, capitalizing on efforts initiated by previous Indian governments as the Chabahar deal which had been 13 years in the making.
Outreach to the Gulf Countries
The Gulf states have historically a source of more than 60% of India’s oil and gas requirements and, therefore, critical to its energy security .
While India only represented only 3% of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s total trade in 1992, it represented 11% in 2012. By 2020, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had become India’s fourth- and third-largest trade partners
Energy and ties have traditionally dominated India’s relations with the Gulf countries but have also been boosted by the existence of a sizeable Indian diaspora. The Gulf states have been home to approximately 8.9 million Indians who contribute about $40 billion in remittances every year and account for about 3 per cent of India’s GDP
In 2015, India’s then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar recognised India’s “historical presence in the Gulf” but also stressed on the need to extend this to further avenues of cooperation and to make India a “credible partner” of regional actors
Modi’s did multiple visits to the Gulf countries to build on and consolidate existing economic ties. The goal was to strengthen the government-to-government ties. He had one prime objective to encourage Gulf sovereign wealth funds to invest in India’s ambitious infrastructure and manufacturing plans at home.
Modi therefore chose the UAE as his first destination in August 2015, but also visited Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar in 2016, as well as the UAE again in 2018 and 2019.
He traveled again to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain in a wide outreach to the Gulf states. Overall, Modi has visited nine Middle Eastern states and territories since 2014, more than his four predecessors combined.
What was the result of all this ?
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other GCC members had increasingly seen India as an important emerging market for their energy exports, foreign investments, and joint venture opportunities.
In 2019 UAE visit, Modi received the Order of Zayed, the UAE’s highest civil decoration, in recognition of his role in improving ties between the two countries .
Every visit of Modi’s was reciprocated by visits of Gulf dignitaries to New Delhi between 2014 and 2020.
Modi also pushed for discussions concerning national security problems like terrorism . These interactions and agreements have included high-level strategic security dialogues (UAE), inter-state defence cooperation agreements (Qatar, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia), intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar) and convergence in enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean region through bilateral activities and in multilateral fora such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
Discussions during the repeated Modi visits to Abu Dhabi and Riyadh focused specifically on finalizing agreements ensuring the extradition of Pakistani and Indian terrorists as well as limiting money laundering activities from these same groups in the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
The UAE again deported in 2019 a Jaish-e-Mohammed commander, Nisar Ahmed Tantray, who was involved in a 2017 terror attack in Kashmir.
New Geopolitical development in Gulf , Pakistan refuses to contribute troops to Saudi-led coalition against Houthis in Yemen
In 2015 Pakistan sent mixed signals about its unconditional military support for Saudi Arabia , refusing to contribute troops to the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen or to quell dissent in Bahrain in 2015.
Modi and his government therefore perceived a potential weakening in Pakistan’s ties with the Gulf states as an opportunity to reinforce India’s own security cooperation with partners in the region.
Conclusion
We see how India saw its potential to play a different role in the Middle East compared to Nehru’s tenure or even the 70s or 90s. Modi govt perceived the importance of the Gulf region and pushed to increase public exchanges and to institutionalize pre-existing ad hoc partnerships.
Modi government recognized the mismatch between growing interests in the Middle East and the limited resources deployed to defend these interests. The Modi government has also been more confident of India’s “growing capacities and national branding” which have made it a more “credible partner” to actors in the Middle East
The future posts will summarise Modi’s role to continuing this cooperation with the Gulf States.
Hope you enjoyed this read and stay tuned for the next part.
Thank you!
