Indian Military Strategy History, 2018 Land Warfare Reforms and the Indian Army Integrated Battlegroups Concept- a Detailed Documentation (Part I)

By u/Plutonian990

PS BEFORE READING: The views are exclusively the author’s own and are purely based on all available information and sources compiled from the Internet.

Stage I: P.M.S Blackett’s Scientific Strategy, India’s Dangerous Geopolitical Game of Chicken Against the PRC (1947–1962)

Part A: Post Independence Scenario (1947–1961)

The original Indian military-strategic theory of tactical and strategic restraint and Pakistani-focused defense strategy can be credited to Nobel Prize-Winning British scientist PMS Blackett- a pivotal member of the British wartime community in World War 2 who was pivotal in developing the ULTRA signals intel network and organizing a coherent bombing strategy of going against maritime targets in the Atlantic — was hired by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru in 1946 to present a scientific strategy for the defense of the newly formed Republic of India. The Armed Forces had retained Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck’s, Armed Force Organisation Plan calling for 200,000 Active Duty Ground troops, a 20 squadron Air Force and a Navy centered around 2 Aircraft Carriers with a primary threat coming from the Great Indian Desert Region (i.e. the post-independence state of Pakistan). P.M.S Blackett had submitted the following recommendations to the Indian Government,:-

1. Maintain a small territorial defense force focusing exclusively on a Defensive Minded Strategy
2. Maintaining a Non Aligned posture against the Soviet Union and the United States
3. Military Expenditure MUST NOT exceed 2% of India’s GDP
4. No need to pursue any Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons)
5. Focus Extensively on Generating economic growth by modernizing core industries, infrastructure, and poverty alleviation.
6. To ensure the Indian Armed Force do not get entangled in a war against a major power, extensive civilian control of the Armed Forces must be maintained in all affairs related to defense.

This extremely pacifist recommendation was taken to an extreme level that pushed India’s Defense Budget below the recommended 2% target- the Army went through a massive demobilization period in which 7 World War II era Divisions were disbanded while the Frontier Guards were divided between India and Pakistan- with Pakistan gaining 7 of the 11 Frontier Divisions, with defense becoming an afterthought. Another issue the Indian Army faced as against other branches was the acute shortage of well-trained and educated officers and NCOs in its units while most of its Heavy Mechanized units were sapped/de-commissioned in a “Peace Dividend” move following the end of the Second World War. This move would set the stage for the First Indo-Pakistan War of 1947–48 in which a defanged Indian Army was essentially reduced to fighting a desperate rearguard action against their more numerous, well-led (mostly because of the fact that Muhammed Ali Jinnah had requested the British Colonial Government to allow their military officers to serve in Pakistani units and more aggressive Pakistani Army counterparts. In fact, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947–48 remains the most intense war the Armed Forces, especially the Army ever fought with most Param Vir Chakras being awarded in this conflict- 5 out of a total of 20 awarded (20% of all Param Vir Chakras ever awarded since 1947). The Armed Forces Chiefs were also relegated to a subordinate role to the civilian government and removed from all key military advisory roles- completely centralizing decision-making authority in the Indian Government rather than the Military itself. This blunder got reinforced by the extremely restrained policy of non-aggression in which Indian tactical commanders had “zero control over their own units and supporting commands in any military region as all decisions had to be routed through the civilian government machinery in New Delhi- first through the Ministry of Defense, then the Cabinet Committee on Defense, then the National Security Advisor and finally the Prime Minister and President, of course, all of them being subject to the political tomfoolery in both Houses”- a problem that has not been sorted- and even worsened by additional complications in the chain of command, till date. This problem will be highlighted later on in this write-up.

Another long-term strategic failure of this move was the fact that while the Indian Armed Forces in a real manner, was preparing for an inevitable conflict with the People’s Republic of China- with the civilian government dangerously escalating matters geopolitically by supporting Tibetian Independence and taking Bhutan and Nepal under its wings- primarily because it wanted to use these states as a strategic tripwire against the Chinese Military power in the region which would give the Indian State ample time to reinforce its frontier along the Chinese Border. This strategy was also pushed to a new height by Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon (in his Forward Policy) who appointed China hawks in the Ministry of Defense and as key Generals in the Indian Eastern Command against China and also managed to piss off the military establishment by dismantling the old seniority-based promotion program for Officer Ranks with a Merit-based system- leading to a leadership crisis in 1958 when General K.S. Thimayya (Chief of Army) resigned — being replaced by General Brij Mohan Kaul- a known China Hawk and had risen to the ranks due to the fact that he was a “personal favorite” of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and VK Krishna Menon (based off former President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan’s Autobiography written in 1991 in which he showed disdain for General BM Kaul).

However, not all was bad at this time frame- the Indians had come off a high in the successful military operations: Operation Polo (Annexation of Hyderabad) in 1948 leading to the integration of the Kingdom of Hyderabad into the Republic of India and Operation Vijay (Annexation of Portuguese India- Goa and Daman & Diu) in 1961. But the 900-pound Elephant in the room was being ignored by the Indian Military and Civilian establishment- the People’s Republic of China. The PRC had come off a momentous high following its civil war and subsequent intervention in the Korean War against the US-led United Nations Coalition lasting until 1953. Following the Korean War, the People’s Liberation Army of China started to change its peasant model popular militia army into a mechanized modern army with extensive Soviet help- modeling itself off the Soviet Armed Forces and creating a Military District style organization model- with 13 Military Districts being created. The PRC operated with the geopolitical psychology of being “at Siege” from Imperialist powers looking to undermine their nation- and Indian affairs of appointing China hawks, courting states that were “obviously” Chinese enclaves (South Tibet, Tibet, and Aksai Chin region), “occupying rightful Chinese clay” (Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh) and belligerent posturing along the Chinese border regions (courtesy of PM Nehru, BM Gaur, and VK Krishna Menon) only pissed off the Chinese even further- leading to the Annexation of Tibet in 1959- in which Nehru FURTHER angered China by hosting the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetian refugees in India. The Indian Republic and PRC were now engaged in a dangerous strategic gambit- or in non-PC terms, a game of chicken in which the person blinks first stands to lose massively, setting an extremely fluid situation along the Tibet-Kashmir-NE Frontier region as a major buildup of forces on both sides continued, blaming each other for escalating the situation and failed talks between both nations set the stage for an inevitable clash.

Part B: The Border Explodes: Sino-Indian War of 1962

(Prelude to the War)

In hindsight, the war was a natural reaction resulting from the tensions simmering in the region since the 1950s. Take your pick: blaming Hawkish policy frameworks especially the Forward Policy of the Ministry of Defense and not matching these commitments with increased defense spending throughout the late 1950s, the McMahon Line Dispute between India and China, the 1957 Kongka Pass Incident in which 9 CRPF personnel were killed and another 10 were taken prisoner by the PLAGF (prisoners were eventually released), Chinese territorial claims, unnecessary escalation of tensions by both sides, the naive thinking on part of Pt. Nehru that China and India can be partners somehow (when all evidence points to the contrary, especially with a belligerent Indian stance), etc. The Chinese and Indians had been building up forces in the region with the Indian Military also willing to enforce the McMahon Line by force if necessary, highlighted by an order sent to Eastern and Western Commands by New Delhi:-

“We are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border as recognized by us. This will be done with a view to establishing additional posts located to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory.”

Such belligerent statements were nothing new by now. For example, in 1962, the Ministry of Home Affairs had made the following statement:-

“If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa*. She will certainly drive out the Chinese forces.”*

The major blunder made here was that the Indian Defense Establishment had grossly underestimated the readiness rates of the PLA along the North East Frontier and over-estimated its own readiness rate, thanks to excessive corruption and bureaucratic delays in the reporting of information all the way up to the chain of command in New Delhi. The next blunder was to not allow the Indian Air Force to conduct any sorties in support of ground forces- CAS or Battlefield Superiority missions were not allowed and the Air Force had been strictly relegated to an Airspace Defense and Regional Interdiction role for “not escalating the situation” (ironically)- the primary fear being that the PLAAF would have retaliated by bombarding Indian population centers- especially New Delhi.

(The “Battle” of Chusul, 1962)

By July 1962, the situation had heated up to a point where the figurative pressure cooker was ready to explode, with Indian forces getting the green light to aggressively push back any Chinese incursions into Indian territory. This situation led to the ugly escalation in the Battle of Chushul on July 7, 1962, in which a company of the J&K Rifles along with 1/8th Gorkhas and 5th Jat Rifle Battalion were surrounded by a force of nearly 350 Chinese troops in their own posts and a screaming match ensured that also involved the use of loudspeakers. Such harassing attacks would continue for the next 3 days until the Chinese gave up on provoking the Indians to open fire and spark an incident that could be used as a pretext for war and withdrew.

The situation had attracted the attention of major Great powers- the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. All 3 nations engaged both sides in a series of talks in order to de-escalate the situation along the entire border region. Predictably, all these talks failed as they had no effect on the simmering tensions with each side refusing to acknowledge the problems or back down from the dangerous situation they had created.

(The Cuban Missile Crisis and its impact on the Cross Border tensions)

As if to highlight the cross border situation in a sick twist of fate, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in their own geopolitical game of chicken in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when the Central Intelligence Agency had notified the US Government that the Soviet Union was basing off Nuclear Tipped R-12 and R-14 Medium Ranged Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Communist Cuba as a matching move to the Americans basing Jupiter MRBMs in Italy and Turkey. The crisis had distracted both the superpowers from the rapidly deteriorating situation at the Sino-Indian border. The Soviets in an effort to shrug off minor incidents so that it could focus on the Americans more, decided to greenlight the Chinese offensive when Premier Mao obtained guarantees that the USSR would not intervene on behalf of the Indians, and the Americans along with the rest of NATO were pre-occupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis leaving India fluttering alone in the wind at a high spot from which it could not back down.

(The Intent of the Chinese and Indians)

For China, a series of declassified CIA reports in 2006 highlighted the intent of the Chinese going to war with India:-

1. The Chinese were terrified of being encircled by American and Soviet client states from all sides. the Chinese were acutely aware of American forces in the Pacific, Korean Peninsula & SE Asia, British Forces in SE Asia, the USSR with its Indian client state, and the Russian Far East would form a steel ring that would choke the Chinese to death.
2. The Chinese wanted to reverse the British gains of the McMahon Line and return Arunanchal Pradesh, Sikkim, parts of Uttarakhand & Himachal Pradesh, and the Aksai Chin region “back to rightful Chinese ownership”.
3. To punish India by showing it as a belligerent and hostile communist power that was not worthy of trust and to widen the Sino-Soviet Split in favor of the Chinese.
4. To reverse the “territorial gains” of the Indians under their belligerent “Forward Policy” by utilizing Salami-slicing tactics of territorial expansion.

For India:

- Maintain the status quo in the region by reaffirming the McMahon Line and the subsequent territories via Forward Policy
- Maintain a Defensive posture in line with the PMS Blackett Strategy along the entire frontier
- Mobilising sufficient forces in the region to prevent future Chinese incursions.

(The Thag La Incident)

In June 1962, Indian troops occupied the Dhola Post in the Thag La Ridge which actually lay North of the actual McMahon Line but South of the Indian interpretation of the McMahon Line. The Chinese issued diplomatic protests and eventually began their own counter-deployments on top of the Thag La range. On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Namka Chu. Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru told the media that the Indian Army had instructions to “free our territory” and the troops had been given the discretion to use force. On September 11th, 1962, all Indian forces were given the order to fire at will on any Chinese incursions into Indian territory. The entire operation was a bust due to unclear policy directives from New Delhi and the fact that the Indian troops had to carry all their equipment ALONG with their heavy equipment at an altitude of 16000+ feet. On September 16th, 1962, the first skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops occurred when PLA troops threw hand grenades on the Indians and a subsequent firefight started across the entire front, with the Indians losing the Dhola Post.

This incident had disillusioned many Indian soldiers and tactical commanders, including Brigadier General John Parushuman Dalvi (who would be captured during the war) voicing their criticism on occupying the Dhola Post in the first place, with the same doubts being shared by many senior officials in the Ministry of Defense.

On 10 October 1962, an Indian Rajput Rifles patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La was met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers. Indian troops were in no position for battle, as Yumtso La was more than 16,000 feet above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops. The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line. The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire. They managed to hold off the first Chinese assault, inflicting heavy casualties. At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gunfire. Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping. Frustrated, the Indians helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault. In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began their retreat, realizing the situation was hopeless. By the time the dust settled, the Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties and the Chinese 33. This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue, but by 18 October, it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack, with a massive troop buildup. A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge

(War Erupts Across the Frontier)

On October 20th, 1962, the People’s Liberation Army of China ignited the Sino-Indian war by attacking along a 1000 kilometer front in both the North and North East. On the Western Theater (Kashmir), the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river while in the East, the Chinese aimed to force the Indians off the Thag La Ridge completely and out of the mountains in the Arunanchal Pradesh region. The PLA would execute night infiltration attacks on isolated Indian battalions and companies while utilizing mortars and heavy artillery to their fullest extent and being the masters in Guerilla warfare (courtesy of 30+ years of combat experience against the Chinese Nationalists, the Japanese in the Second Sino Japanese War and the Americans in the Korean War), the Chinese would cut down Indian troops with ease. However, the war was not one-sided as the Indian Army would put up extremely tenacious resistance even in the face of overwhelming odds- for example, in the Battle of Walong (18th October-16th November 1962), the 6th Kumaon Regiment put up tenacious resistance despite repeated PLA attacks with Indian mortars and machine-gun fire cutting down PLA troops and holding their position for 4 hours before retreating and leaving a company back for rear-guard action.

(Progress of the Sino-Indian War in Kashmir with corroborating claims of both sides)

Eventually, even with the full-spirited defense of the Indian Army, the Chinese were able to push them out of the Aksai Chin region and even gain more territory than the original Chinese territorial claims. The Indian side was fighting without Air or Artillery support as I had mentioned before- Centralisation and Micro-management of the war from New Delhi doomed the Indian defense effort. The Indian Air Force was not allowed to fly combat sorties in support of the Indian defenders on the ground while artillery support was withheld up to a time frame of 24 hours- at a time where every minute proved critical, the artillery support was withheld because the civilian government had not decided whether firing heavy artillery would escalate the war or not (again, ironic). By 22nd October 1962, the Chinese had entered 16.4 kilometers deep South of the original McMahon Line across the entire front in Kashmir and started fortifying their positions. Meanwhile, the PRC decided to negotiate from a position of strength and offered to end the war with the following demands:-

1. A negotiated settlement of the boundary
2. That both sides disengage and withdraw 20 kilometers (12 mi) from present lines of actual control
3. A Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA
4. That China and India do not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.

Not daring to lose any Indian territory with the upcoming general elections and the loss of face for Nehru and the Indian National Congress, Nehru on 27th October 1962 responded with the request that:-

“Restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the boundary prior to 8 September 1962. He was categorically concerned about a mutual 20 kilometers withdrawal after 40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression”. He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offense.”

Premier Zhou re-affirmed his original claims presented in the letter before. Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure, the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution that stated their intent to “drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India” and issued a general mobilization. The war continued on 14th November 1962, with the Chinese cutting off 10,000 troops of the Indian 4th “Red Eagle” Infantry Division near Se La and Bomdi La and cutting off the supply route of the Indian troops by occupying Thembang. On the Western Front, the PLA advanced and engaged Indian troops in the Battle of Chushul in which Indian forces were hit relentlessly with waves of PLA troops and holding their position. On Rezang La, the situation had turned desperate as the 123 troops were hit by Chinese mortars, heavy artillery, and machine-gun fire from the heights. This was also the place where Major Shaitan Singh would make his last stand against hopeless odds- engaging nearly 900 PLA troops with a Bren LMG for 4 hours before being killed, buying vital time for the remnants of the 114th Infantry Brigade to withdraw to the next defensive line- Major Shaitan Singh would be awarded the Param Vir Chakra Posthumously for his actions.

By 19th November 1962, the PLA had achieved all of its objectives and declared a front wide ceasefire.

Premier Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight, 21 November. Zhou’s ceasefire declaration stated:-

“Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.”

The Chinese had inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Indian Army but taking a punishment off its own, losses on both sides totaled in the thousands in under a month of intensive fighting.

To highlight the strategic failure and the chaos that followed, Pt. Nehru’s correspondence letters with US President John F Kennedy highlight the increasingly desperate situation which was highlighted by the tone of each letter

Excerpts from Letter One:

New Delhi
19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

It is now a month since the Chinese massive attack on India started on 20th October. I think I must write to you again to acquaint you with further developments that have occurred since my letter of 29th October. Before I deal with these further developments I would like to say that we are extremely grateful to you and the Government and people of the United States of America for the practical support given to us. We particularly appreciate the speed with which the urgently needed small arms and ammunition were rushed to India.

There was a deceptive lull after the first Chinese offensive during which the Chinese mounted a serious propaganda offensive in the name of peace to get us to accept their so-called three-point proposals which, shorn of their wrappings, actually constituted a demand for surrender on their terms. The Chinese tried, despite our rejection of these proposals to get various Afro-Asian countries to intercede with varying offers of mediation.

After my clear and categorical statement in Parliament on 14th November rejecting the three-point proposal of Chou En-Lai, the Chinese who had made full preparations to put further military pressure on us restarted their military offensive. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of a statement on the developments in the military situation during the last few days which I made in the Parliament this morning. Bomdila which was the Headquarters of our North-East Frontier Agency Command has been surrounded and the equivalent of two divisions engaged in the operations in the N.E.F.A. area are fighting difficult rearguard actions. It is not quite certain how many of them will be able to extricate themselves and Join the Corps Headquarters at Tezpur further south.

The Chinese are by and large in possession of the greater portion of the North-East Frontier Agency and are poised to overrun Chushul in Ladakh. There is nothing to stop them after Chushul till they reach Leh, the Headquarters of the Ladakh province of Kashmir.

Excerpt from Letter Two:

New Delhi
19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sala Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened, and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.

The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North won’t be on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack, and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.

Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not oak for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.

The situation that has developed is, however, really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.

We have repeatedly felt the need of using air-arm in support of our land forces, but have been unable to do as in the present state of our air and radar equipment we have no defense age fret retaliatory action by the Chinese.

I, therefore, request that immediate support be given to strengthening our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of a Chinese advance.

I am advised that for providing adequate air defense a minimum of 12 squadrons or supersonic all-weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are almost immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel is being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentration may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.

Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g, Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.

The Sino-Indian War remains a major shakeup for the entire Indian Defense establishment as it represented a failure of the PMS Blackett’s Strategy of Territorial Defense as depleted forces with no battle plans and independence of the three branches (in this case the Air Force and the Army) along with a hawkish strategy led to total disaster and led to a major purge in the Indian Government as PM Nehru, Defense Minister Krishna Menon and Chief of Staff BM Gaur were forced to resign with the war still breeding deep resentment in the minds of Indians till date. The post-war Henderson Brooks report was constituted in 1963 highlighting what went wrong and due to the sensitivity of the report, remains classified till today (partial de-classification was done by an Australian Journalist Neville Maxwell in 2014, leading to his book India’s China War)

That’s all for this post, in the next part I will discuss the Post ’62 reforms, the Indo Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971 along with the Sundarji Doctrine and emergence of RAPID units. Suggestions, Challenges, and Doubts are more than welcome.

Additional Sources used:-

Arming Without Aiming- India’s Military Modernization by Stephen P Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta
India’s China War by Neville Maxwell
Defense Reforms in India- A National Imperative by Brookings Institution India, Gurmeet Kanwal, and Neha Kohli

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